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Stem cell treatments are being offered in Indian clinics although preclinical
evidence of their efﬁcacy and safety is lacking. This is attributed to a
governance vacuum created by the lack of legally binding research
guidelines. By contrast, this paper highlights jurisdictional ambiguities arising
from trying to regulate stem cell therapy under the auspices of research
guidelines when treatments are offered in a private market disconnected from
clinical trials. While statutory laws have been strengthened in 2014, prospects
for their implementation remain weak, given embedded challenges of putting
healthcare laws and professional codes into practice. Finally, attending to the
capacities of consumer law and civil society activism to remedy the problem
of unregulated treatments, the paper ﬁnds that the very deﬁnition of a
governance vacuum needs to be reframed to clarify whose rights to health
care are threatened by the proliferation of commercial treatments and
individualized negligence-based remedies for grievances.
Keywords: stem cell therapy; India; STS and biomedical governance
Introduction
India is a key player in the stem cell sector with signiﬁcant government investment
in this area and research activities including the creation of new embryonic cell
lines and publication of scientiﬁc papers (Inamdar et al. 2009; Sharma 2009;
Tiwari and Desai 2011). While these efforts have been commended nationally
and in the international community (e.g. Lander et al. 2008), signiﬁcant concerns
began to emerge from the mid-2000s over unproven stem cell treatments being
offered in clinics with apparently little by way of regulatory oversight (Jayaraman
2005). In 2014, it appears that the Indian government has responded to these con-
cerns by announcing legal changes that would, in theory, outlaw stem cell therapies
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given the absence of clinical trial evidence of their safety and efﬁcacy (CDSCO
2014). In this paper, we aim to make sense of why stem cell activities have been
historically difﬁcult to govern and the implications for the implementation of
recent regulatory developments (CDSCO 2014; ICMR-DBT 2013).
Various Indian clinics have been accused of making false claims about the efﬁ-
cacy of a wide range of stem cell treatments and, in some cases, offering fake
declarations of approval from governing bodies (Pandya 2008; Sipp 2009). The
reported use of embryonic stem cell therapies by Nutech Mediworld in New
Delhi attracted widespread condemnation (Basu 2005; Cohen and Cohen 2010;
Khullar 2009; Padma 2006; Ramesh 2005; Srinivasan 2006). Other claims related
to clinical use of adult stem cells have also been controversial; for example, Lifeline
Hospital in Chennai claimed that an injection of stem cells can help “improve nerve
function” following spinal cord injury, although there is no clinical evidence that
this is yet possible (Pandya 2008). A rise in so-called stem cell tourism with patients
from theWest traveling to India to be treated has been particular cause for concern in
international commentary (Cohen and Cohen 2010). Such uses of stem cells are
taken to be “experimental”, in that the regimes in question are yet to be proven treat-
ments established as such through a recognized framework of clinical trials. In the
absence of evidence that international and national guidelines on stem cell treat-
ments were being followed and the apparent inability of Indian regulatory agencies
to rectify the situation, scholars and practitioners have argued that stem cell devel-
opment in India operated in a “governance vacuum” (Salter 2008).
Concerns about regulatory shortcomings around stem cell activities are not
unique to India. For example, while some commentators characterize the
problem in India as a departure from “internationally accepted” standards for bio-
medicine (e.g. Cohen and Cohen 2010), others (e.g. Qiu 2009; Sipp 2009) highlight
examples of unproven/untested stem cell treatments being advertised and offered in
a range of countries including the USA, the birthplace of codiﬁed discourse on
medical ethics and bioethics. Some of this links to the rise of Internet advertising
of new treatments, the proliferation of cross-border networks and the challenges
of governance in such a deterritorialized context. The emergence of unproven
stem cell therapies in other countries including China, Hungary, Russia Thailand
and some parts of Europe (Bianco et al. 2013) and an associated rise in inter-
national “stem cell tourism” have also been noted (Cohen and Cohen 2010; Qiu
2009; Sipp 2009). While we focus in our paper on India, this case should be under-
stood within the wider global political economy of stem cell activity.
The Indian stem cell sector sparked signiﬁcant social science interest from the
mid-2000s onwards with several studies concluding that the governance vacuum
in India was a result of the lack of statutory regulation of stem cell activities
(Cohen and Cohen 2010; Glasner 2009; Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2009,
2010; Salter 2008; Salter et al. 2007; Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra 2011). In
2007, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) and the Department of Bio-
technology (DBT) jointly issued a set of Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and
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Therapy (ICMR-DBT 2007). This 76-page document speciﬁed general ethical prin-
ciples for research and processes for formal committee approval of stem cell activi-
ties and for their periodic review/monitoring. In terms of procedures and underlying
norms, the content was in line with mainstream bioethics. The Guidelines stipulated
that clinical use of stem cells was not permitted and that any use of stem cells in
clinical contexts (with the exception of already standardized uses of bone
marrow transplantation and epithelial therapies for corneal disorders) must be
part of a clinical trial conducted after approval by a committee set up to oversee
stem cell activity the Institutional Committee for Stem Cell Research and
Therapy (IC-SCRT), the relevant research ethics committee and the Drug Control-
ler General of India (DCGI) who sits within the Central Drugs Standard Control
Organization (CDSCO). However, since these guidelines lacked statutory
backing, many scholars concluded that the way forward would be to give them leg-
islative weight. Yet, the picture emerging from the social science literature on the
broader complexities of India’s stem cell sector has not been matched by a similar
approach to the complexity of law and regulation.
For example, most authors acknowledge the ethical and political conundrum of
high-tech stem cell activities taking place in a context of extreme inequalities in
income and in access to basic health care (Bharadwaj and Glasner 2009; Glasner
2009; Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2009, 2010; Salter 2008; Sleeboom-Faulkner
and Patra 2011). Bharadwaj (2012, 2014) also reminds us that the meanings of stem
cells are culturally speciﬁc, thus implicitly opening up the assumptions that
underlie the critique of unproven therapies being offered in India. Patra and Slee-
boom-Faulkner (2010) consider how Indian stem cell researchers interpret the
ICMR-DBT guidelines on the ground, providing the ﬁrst clue that the manner of
implementation is at least as important as the making of new laws. However,
social scientists have yet to examine the governance of stem cell activities in
India asking basic questions such as the following: How has the governance
problem around stem cells been framed in India? What are the possible pathways
for governing stem cell activity, including, but not restricted to, statutory guide-
lines? What does the effort to debate and govern stem cell therapy conceal as
well as reveal about India’s engagement with biomedicine?
In this paper, we address these questions by drawing on approaches in STS and
socio-legal studies that help us conceptualize the ambiguity of governing “thera-
peutic contexts demarcated as experimental sites” (Bharadwaj 2014, 85). In the
process, we highlight an unspoken tension in social science work on the Indian
stem cell sector with some investigations taking the “problem” of a vacuum in gov-
ernance as a given (Glasner 2009; Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2009, 2010; Salter
2008; Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra 2011) and others implicitly challenging the
framing of “maverick” science as a problem to be governed (e.g. Bharadwaj
2014; Bharadwaj and Glasner 2009). Yet, this tension can be a productive one
by keeping law as a mode of governance in sight while prompting new questions
about it.
New Genetics and Society 415
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ott
ing
ha
m]
 at
 07
:28
 06
 Ju
ly 
20
16
 
Our work is grounded in STS approaches to science, law and governance
(Cloatre and Pickersgill 2015; Jasanoff 2005, 2011b), key insights from which
are summarized in the ﬁrst section. We then examine the signiﬁcance of how the
“object of governance” is constituted in the Indian stem cell case, paying speciﬁc
attention to boundaries of jurisdiction between different regulatory agencies in the
domains of biomedicine, biomedical research and stem cells. Glasner (2009) argues
that stem cell therapy in India exists in a liminal space between accepted global
standards and local, cultural ones. But liminality applies not just to the global/
local, but to the space that straddles research and clinical practice as we explore
in this paper.
Second, the focus on a statutory gap as the underlying cause of legitimacy pro-
blems seems to be based on the assumption that laws, once enacted, automatically
coerce people to behave in the ways intended by their designers. Yet, scholars in
socio-legal studies have long highlighted the limits of a purely “top-down”
approach to understanding the nature and abilities of state intervention and of
law itself (e.g. Kagan, Gunningham, and Thornton 2003; May 2005). Issues of
meaning, discretion and judgment remain important in the domain of more
formal and codiﬁed laws. In democratic societies, when law “works” – or when
it is seen to work – it is through a process that unfolds and becomes enacted
through society rather than being imposed on it. This in turn also means that
non-statutory guidelines do not necessarily have to produce disorder or ethical
transgressions as social or professional norms sometimes produce law-like behav-
ior (Jasanoff 2011b). The failure of India’s stem cell guidelines therefore needs to
be explained rather than assumed to be the natural outcome of their non-statutory
status. Multiple approaches to governing health care in India are now emerging
beyond those represented by statutory laws alone (Peters and Muraleedharan
2008) and we examine their signiﬁcance for the implementation of recent stem
cell laws. In this context, we ask what efforts to debate and govern stem cell activity
exclude as well as include in shaping the problem at stake.
Law, society and the making of governance
The struggle to regulate the objects and practices of the biosciences and technologies
has been extensively investigated in STS (e.g. see chapters in Cloatre and Pickersgill
2015 and in Jasanoff 2005, 2011a; Kim 2013; Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2010;
Raman and Tutton 2010; Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra, 2008; Sunder Rajan 2007).
At stake for law and law-making systems is the question of whether biotechnologies
constitute entirely novel domains of intervention – therefore needing new legal per-
spectives and instruments for their governance – or if they should be seen as incre-
mental extensions of current activities – in which case, existing systems might be
adequate. Jasanoff (2005) shows that different national systems have engaged
with these questions differently in ways shaped by their political cultures. The com-
parative approach adopted in this work stimulates some fundamental questions
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about the making of biotechnology governance that are relevant even where we
might focus on particular national systems as in this paper.
First, how do particular activities come to be seen as risky or needing regulation
while others do not – and vice versa? A central problem for biotechnology govern-
ance in all countries is the uneasy tension between the imperative to promote new
technologies and the imperative to regulate them. The establishment and perceived
legitimacy of a regulatory apparatus for biomedical research has helped governing
bodies in Britain and the USA to manage this tension in different sectors, though
the extent to which these attempts are successful varies over time and sector (for
example, questions periodically emerge over the lack of regulation of US stem
cell activity in the private sector or over the activities overseen by the Human Fer-
tilisation and Embryology Authority in Britain). In historical terms, the tension has
been transformed into a productive one for scientists with regulation seen as a way
of managing reputational risk (Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft 2008), and in that
respect, enabling rather than only constraining research. Comparing the US
response to crop biotechnology with that of Britain and Germany, Jasanoff
(2005) argues that the early lack of concern in the USA was in keeping with the
state’s reliance on science as a mode of handling controversy. In the 1980s, molecu-
lar biologists framed the technology as an extension of established techniques, thus
helping to keep crop biotechnology politically invisible; a similar approach in
Britain was initially successful, but the bovine spongiform encephalopathy crisis
altered the status of science advice and helped to “open up” the regulation of bio-
technology. Scandals can help galvanize a case for regulation, though the outcome
depends on how such a case is framed.
Second, when new objects of governance are made visible as needing interven-
tion, how are they constituted and ordered? For example, both human and agricul-
tural biotechnologies have been constituted as a series of products in the USA, thus
allowing them to be regulated by existing frameworks of contract law for market
transactions with any grievances handled through the courts (Jasanoff 2011b).
By contrast, countries like Britain handled technologies such as those relating to
surrogacy through family law. Different ways of constituting the object lent them-
selves to different spheres of jurisdiction, the political and cultural legitimacy of
which allowed governments to manage controversies around new technologies.
Research on law-making therefore highlights the value of looking beyond the stat-
utory status of guidelines to ask how legal or regulatory questions are framed in the
ﬁrst place and how this matters for jurisdictional boundaries.
Third, it is not enough to look at how formal laws and policies come into exist-
ence since professional and political norms of practice and judgment may acquire
law-like qualities despite never having been formally articulated as such (Jasanoff
2011b). This connects with work in political science on ways of thinking about
governance (Pierre and Peters 2000), as well as with STS notions of “scientiﬁc gov-
ernance” (Irwin 2008) where governance or the creation of order is understood in
terms of the interaction between different mechanisms rather than necessarily
New Genetics and Society 417
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centered on the state. These might include activities of the professions, industry and
civil society as well as government. For example, civil society groups might put
pressure on the professions, industries or the state in order to hold them to
account in terms of their role in governing. This can also work across borders in
a “glocalization of law” (Randeria 2003) where civil society groups draw on inter-
national standards to contest policies introduced by particular state agencies (see
also London and Schneider 2012). Writing on the Bhopal disaster, Jasanoff
(1988) argues that the effectiveness of right-to-know laws depends in part on
acknowledgements of the institutional duty to disclose information and the rights
of citizens to participate in choices about technology. In the case of medical treat-
ment, these choices tend to become individualized – however, activists and civil
society groups could play a crucial role by making relevant information more
public.
Fourth and related to the above, a key question is what happens to statutory laws
once they come into existence. Asking this question also opens up the possibility of
interactions between (different levels within) the state, professions or other commu-
nities, industries and civil society in the process of implementing formal laws and
policies. For laws to have social meaning “they must become embedded in people’s
imaginations and understandings, and worked out in their practical dealings with
one another” (Jasanoff 2011b, 15). The ﬂip side is that some laws may exist
only in the rulebooks rather than in practice, producing an “implementation
gap.” Others may be re-interpreted, reshaped and given new meanings through
the course of being implemented in various settings. Scholars in law and society
have examined factors shaping compliance, non-compliance and, in some cases,
“over-compliance” with the law by different actors in various domains (Kagan,
Gunningham, and Thornton 2003; May 2005). These studies pinpoint a variety
of potential factors inﬂuencing behavior: fear of sanctions; visibility and frequency
of inspections/monitoring; level of trust in public institutions; fear of threats to
reputational risk; and normative beliefs about “doing the right thing.” In exploring
the relevance of these issues of law-in-practice to Indian stem cell activities, we
draw on related research on health care law and ethics in India (Madhiwalla
2011; Peters and Muraleedharan 2008; Thatte, Kulkarni-Munshi, and Kalekar
2009). For example, a review of Indian policies around participant injury in clinical
research found that researchers were largely unaware of their responsibilities
(Thatte, Kulkarni-Munshi, and Kalekar 2009).
Finally, bringing a civil society perspective into the study of law opens up the
possibility of fundamentally rethinking the terms on which the regulatory
problem at stake has been framed in the ﬁrst place. Investigating stem cell govern-
ance in South Korea, Kim (2013) argues that the relevant question is much more
than about the way to deal with research misconduct, an issue on which much com-
mentary has centered in the aftermath of the HwangWoo Suk scandal. Civil society
activists have instead argued for stricter controls in order to deal with potential
threats to the public interest from a dominant capitalist-developmental drive
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toward biotechnology. Likewise, Sunder Rajan (2007) reframes the conventional
focus on informed consent in Indian clinical trials with the socioeconomic one
of who beneﬁts from such research. As Cloatre and Pickersgill (2015) argue,
legal engagements with science represent particular visions of how we should
live and exclude alternative futures. Research on stem cell governance needs to
acknowledge the inequalities entailed in the politics of life (Raman and Tutton
2010) which, in this case, means being sensitive to why a governance vacuum
matters and to whom.
Methods
To understand the making and interpretation of law-in-practice, it is essential to
consider how stakeholders “on the ground” perceive the key issues – in this
case, difﬁculties around stem cell governance and prospects for their remediation.
Hence, a qualitative study of documents in different media (news and opinion,
scientiﬁc literature, policy reports), and interviews with key stakeholders was
undertaken.
Semi-structured interviews were conducted after ethical approval from the Uni-
versity of Nottingham during June 2010–January 2011, and again during Septem-
ber–October 2011, in various cities in India including New Delhi, Mumbai, Pune,
Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Tirupati, Kolkata and Chandigarh where most of
the research and clinical activities in stem cells are being carried out. Locations
were identiﬁed on the basis of a mapping exercise in 2010 using documents avail-
able on the Internet. 27 interviews (5 scientists, 11 clinicians, 7 ﬁrms’ representa-
tives and four policy-makers) were conducted by the ﬁrst author, lasting between
45 minutes and an hour (with one exception, where the interview ﬁnished in 15
minutes). The majority of the interviews were recorded with the informants’ per-
mission, and transcribed. However, in three cases, informants were not comfortable
with the prospect of being recorded; hence, notes were taken and subsequently
written up.
Documents included news-items on stem cell activities published between 2001
and 2012 in leading newspapers available on the Internet (The Times of India, The
Hindu, The Indian Express), science magazines (BioSpectrum India), ofﬁcial docu-
ments related to stem cell research and medical governance published by govern-
ment bodies, and articles published in international journals on stem cells in India
(e.g. Nature, Science). There is a lively debate in Indian newspapers and journals
(especially the Indian Journal of Medical Ethics) on the state of medical ethics
in the country. These articles also provided key insights into how parts of the
medical profession in India perceive the issues that are being discussed elsewhere
in the international media and journal literature. Finally, in updating the research for
this paper, current news-items were included to take on board recent developments
in stem cell regulation and developments reported in the Indian media around
medical negligence.
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Constituting stem cell research as the object of governance
In addition to the non-statutory status of the 2007 ICMR-DBT guidelines, scholars
have identiﬁed a fragmentation of regulatory authority as a problem for stem cell
governance (Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2009; Salter et al. 2007). The ICMR
is part of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, while the DBT is in the Min-
istry of Science and Technology. Yet, such a structure does not necessarily have to
fail as it might represent an effective way of combining forces in complex situations
calling for multiple sources of expertise. Following Jasanoff’s (2011b) injunction to
consider how biotechnology is ordered, we ask how stem cell therapy has been con-
stituted as a regulatory object. Framing the question this way sheds light on the
terms in which the “problem” to be regulated is made visible and jurisdictional
boundaries drawn, which, in turn, allows us to consider if these boundaries
might be deﬁned differently.
In the early days, the Indian government was keen to promote Dr Shroff’s work
with the then Health Secretary quoted in 2005 as saying that “sometimes, scientiﬁc
knowledge cannot wait for bureaucratic apparatus” (Mudur 2005). However, fears
about reputational risk (Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft 2008) began to emerge and
stimulated a regulatory response. Many Indian scientists and clinicians expressed
concerns to journalists about unwarranted claims made by Dr Shroff and others
(e.g. Lifeline Hospital, Chennai; All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New
Delhi) regarding successful treatments based on stem cells (see Mudur 2005). A
few took to journals in science and in medical ethics to criticize these claims and
the lack of an effective response from government (e.g. Jayaraman 2005; Padma
2006; Pandya 2008). Some of these criticisms came from stem cell scientists con-
cerned that those making unveriﬁable and overstated claims about stem cells posed
a threat to the reputation of others working according to established norms of
research. Many urged the ICMR to take a ﬁrmer stance and “mandate” medical
ethics (Mudur 2005).
Given their keenness to secure investor conﬁdence in biomedical research
(Sunder Rajan 2007), it is not surprising that the Indian government responded
quickly to these developments with the 2007 ICMR-DBT guidelines that were
modeled on established liberal-bioethical frameworks. However, critics argued
that these needed to have legislative force (e.g. Pandya 2008), a point that was
also evident during interviews conducted with key players. One scientist
working in a government-funded research laboratory observed with reference to
the ICMR-DBT guidelines that
Now it has to pass through parliament as a rule and once it is made as a rule then prob-
ably those malpractices will be stopped, otherwise it will not stop. (Scientist 1)
He also argued that those who violated the guidelines should be punished. A private
medical practitioner, who himself offers experimental stem cell therapy for muscu-
lar dystrophy, lamented that everyone was free to offer stem cell therapy:
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[The] government of India has policies but I think they are sluggish . . . the legislation
in India does not have any teeth on the stem cell therapy providers . . . currently there
is no law for that; just a guideline if you violated nobody is bothered. (Clinician 1)
This seems to conﬁrm the point made in the social science literature on Indian stem
cell activities (Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2010; Salter 2008) that guidelines
cannot compel action in the way that laws ostensibly can. However, while the
development of guidelines as a response to controversy was seemingly straightfor-
ward, the question of jurisdictional authority over their implementation has been
more complicated. What was missed in this debate was the fact that neither the
ICMR nor the DBT has a legislative remit over medical research. Interviewees
in government and industry pointed out that the ICMR funds research and provides
advice, while the DBT is an agency for funding (rather than regulating) preclinical
and clinical R&D. Also, the DBT has no remit over activities taking place outside
government-funded R&D programs (Policy-maker 2). Its stem cell task force and
committees oversee the DBT’s own research activities, but these do not cover clini-
cal trials.
The DCGI which is frequently characterized as the “Indian FDA” already had a
mandate to regulate clinical trials and would have been the obvious candidate to
extend its remit to stem cells. Only the DCGI has the authority to regulate their
activities, an industry representative was quick to point out (Firms representative
2). However, the DCGI had no experts of its own who were able to evaluate
stem cell proposals, according to a policy-maker. Also, in these early days, it
appeared that the DCGI was uncertain about the reach of its powers which may
be due to the fact that it is only nominally similar to the FDAwith a remit primarily
related to drug approvals (Sunder Rajan 2007). “Our FDA is not that strong” noted
a policy-maker (Policy-maker 2). Clinician 1 quoted above added:
Even if you go to the Drug Controller of India he says, what can I do . . . when I don’t
have powers to crush you, even if you don’t follow the guidelines why should I bother
you? (Clinician 1)
This suggests a fundamental jurisdictional ambiguity with even the relevant agency
unsure of what falls under its regulatory scope. The following quote from a policy-
maker explains more clearly the reasons for this ambiguity. Referring to the wider
landscape of medical law, this policy-maker suggested:
whatever they (i.e. doctors) do in the name of research they should follow the ICMR
guidelines but the problem with the stem cell therapy is that those who are offering
therapy don’t consider it as research . . . OK . . . they think that it is therapeutic . . .
any doctor has the right to give treatment . . . so they are doing their practice . . . it
(does) not come under research . . . so there is no need for any permission and
there is no need to follow any guidelines . . . you really can’t punish them. (Policy-
maker 3, emphasis added)
Here, we begin to see that the jurisdictional difﬁculties around identifying who has
authority to regulate stem cell “research” have arisen partly from the ambiguous
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boundary between research and therapy. For those offering stem cell therapy, guide-
lines pertaining to “research” do not appear to have meaning since they seem them-
selves as treating patients rather than using them as research subjects for publishable
studies (see also Bharadwaj 2014). Indeed, comparing the 2007 guidelines with
the draft revisions published in 2012 (ICMR-DBT 2012) and subsequently ﬁnalized
in 2013, the most dramatic change relates to the very title. In 2007, the document
was labeled Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Therapy (emphasis added).
By 2012/2013, this now reads Guidelines for Stem Cell Research. The writers of
the Foreword to the 2013 document draw attention to the change, explaining that
this was done to avoid confusion over the fact that stem cell therapy is not
allowed in the ﬁrst place, hence there can be no guidelines to govern it! The
2013 guidelines reiterate the point that any clinical use of stem cells must be part
of an authorized clinical trial, a point that was already present in the 2007
version, but did not have meaning for those carrying out the offending activity.
To summarize, constituting the regulatory object as “research” enabled the
ICMR to bring its expertise in stem cells and bioethics to bear on the problem.
However, since the ICMR can only provide advice, the DCGI’s statutory powers
were highlighted as the answer to the problem of ICMR’s guidelines being
ignored in practice. However, insofar as unproven therapy was being provided in
clinical settings outside recognized clinical trials, bringing this activity under
DCGI’s remit proved challenging in the ﬁrst instance.
This marks a key difference from the scandals that stimulated the codiﬁcation of
medical research regulation in the West (Dixon-Woods and Ashcroft 2008). Where
those controversies were sparked by ethical questions raised by clinical trials with
clinicians appearing to pursue research goals rather than the needs of (some)
patients, the issue in the Indian context is not about research per se (deﬁned as
that occurring in the context of clinical trials) but a market for experimental treat-
ments. Strikingly, none of the clinicians interviewed as part of this study spoke
about conducting clinical trials or even “research,”; rather, their focus was on
stem cells as a therapeutic intervention offered in most cases for a fee.
Reconstituting stem cell governance
So far, we have highlighted the jurisdictional ambiguities that challenge one-
dimensional accounts of a governance vacuum in stem cell research. Yet, jurisdic-
tional boundaries and the objects of regulation can be open to re-constitution as was
evident at the time of ﬁeldwork and conﬁrmed by recent developments in stem cell
governance. In light of the persistent controversy over stem cell therapies, the story
of what the “Indian FDA” can or cannot do was slowly being opened up to alterna-
tive interpretations in interviews conducted in 2010–2011. For example, one
policy-maker observed:
Initially, DCGI thought that stem cell does not fall as a biological entity so they say
that it does not come under their purview so they started forwarding . . . all these
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applications to ICMR. But later on they realised that it is part of schedule Y, it comes
under biological cell or vaccine or recombinant. (Policy-maker 1)
The point here is that as clinicians begin to offer marketable stem cell products,
they were opening themselves up to scrutiny by the DCGI under its existing
remit which (unlike the DBT) covers both public and private activities.
In 2012, the DCGI constituted a special division for stem cells in response to cri-
ticisms that it does not have any internal evaluation mechanism (BioSpectrum
India, 30 April 2012). In practice, DCGI’s reliance on the ICMR is set to continue
as ICMR’s Director-General is also the Chairman of the new division, though as
one interviewee noted, both agencies are part of the same Ministry and this co-
working needs not be construed as a problem (Policy-maker 2). The government
of India also set up a long-awaited National Apex Committee for Stem Cell
Research and Therapy (NAC-SCRT) to oversee and monitor activities in this
ﬁeld. In 2014, in addition to the publication of revised guidelines mentioned
above from the ICMR-DBT, the DCGI announced that it would modify the
Drugs and Cosmetics Act to treat “stem cells and cell-based products” as new
drugs (CDSCO 2014). With this announcement, it appears that the regulatory
vacuum in the Indian stem cell sector is ﬁnally being addressed by statutory law.
Yet, if the meaning of law is determined in practice, legal amendments are insufﬁ-
cient in themselves to draw a line under the challenges of stem cell governance.
While the DCGI has addressed the ambiguity over who has legal jurisdiction
over stem cell uses, we still need to know how medical law works on the ground
in order to make sense of the practical implications of DCGI’s efforts. In the
next section, we explore ways in which clinical medicine is regulated in India
and their prospects for contributing to the governance of stem cell therapy.
Enacting stem cell governance through regulation of clinical practice?
For punishing you should have a strong mechanism so that you know . . . somebody
has to complain . . . the complaint has to be seen by somebody and then you can take
it to human rights or anything for the punishment . . . otherwise you can’t do any-
thing. (Policy-maker 3)
Jurisdictional ambiguities over the governance of stem cell therapy seem to have
ﬁnally been resolved with the ICMR-DBT revising their guidelines and the
DCGI extending their statutory remit to stem cells in 2013–2014. Yet, even
well-ordered statutory laws require mechanisms for enforcement. In the above
quote, our interviewee implicitly raises the possibility of potential violations
altogether going unnoticed. In this section, we consider two possible routes by
which recent stem cell laws may – or may not – be enacted in practice, ﬁrst,
through professional self-regulation and second, through the broader ediﬁce of stat-
utory law governing clinical practice. We examine the difference, if any, that law
makes through its interaction with the medical profession and the courts.
New Genetics and Society 423
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 N
ott
ing
ha
m]
 at
 07
:28
 06
 Ju
ly 
20
16
 
International and national guidelines stipulate that clinical uses of stem cells
must be as part of a clinical trial for research conducted under established regulat-
ory protocols. If, as we have argued, stem cell therapy escaped the regulatory net
due to its location in a health care market rather than research per se, one option
might be self-regulation through ethical codes of conduct that cover clinical prac-
tice. Indeed, if medical ethics predates the development of ethics for medical
research, this seems an obvious response. Speciﬁc norms can emerge and
acquire law-like qualities (Jasanoff 2011b) through the process of medical edu-
cation and subsequent membership in a professional community. The state plays
a role here by validating the profession and providing an overarching structure
within which medical providers govern themselves. If this type of normative be-
havior has not emerged around stem cell therapy, we need to consider why.
Sanctioned by the Indian Medical Council Act of 1956, the Medical Council of
India (MCI) is the primary regulatory body for maintaining uniform standards of
medical education and certifying medical qualiﬁcations. Medical practitioners reg-
ister through state-level councils overseen by the MCI. In 2002, the MCI intro-
duced the Indian Medical Council (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics)
Regulations, 2002 to cover codes of conduct for practitioners, which again
operate through state councils. However, violations of the code have been noted
and the code itself challenged as impractical in a highly market-driven health
care sector. For instance, some clinicians and corporate hospitals advertise their
medical services through media interviews or hoardings at public places although
the medical code considers advertising to be unethical (Balasubramanian 2008).
Overall, the MCI, at both central and state levels, is perceived to be ineffective
in monitoring codes of conduct with critics charging that “they have not bothered
to exercise the powers given to check unethical medical practice” (Pandya 2007, 2).
The MCI and state medical councils have also been plagued with corruption
charges over the years (Pandya 2007; The Times of India, 24 April 2010).
In addition to state-sanctioned councils, the Indian Medical Association (IMA) is
the main professional body for doctors. Its website highlights that “[IMA] looks
after the interest of doctors as well as the well-being of the community at
large.”1 However, in a stinging critique, one doctor charges the IMAwith behaving
“as an interest group pushing the special interests of doctors instead of society as a
whole” and altogether failing to contribute to policy on improving health indices in
India (Thomas 2011, 2). Dr Thomas also takes the MCI to task for failing to provide
leadership on ethics education for doctors (Thomas 2011).
What, though, are the reasons for the failure of ethical codes to be translated into
practice? Madhiwalla (2011, 3) argues that the medical profession in India has not
traditionally faced the type of public scrutiny that medicine received in the West
owing to its origins as a sector built “by both the colonial and the independent
Indian state as the vehicle of modernity and welfare.” An interest in bioethics
emerged in the 1980s from controversy over the role of medicine in the 1984
Bhopal disaster and earlier, in sterilization programs introduced during the 1975
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Emergency. However, it remained a “niche” interest with few roots in professional
education. As India emerged as a key provider in a newly globalized health indus-
try, formalized procedures and frameworks for ethics have been eagerly embraced
(Madhiwalla 2011) and actively promoted by contract research organizations
(CROs) seeking to secure investor conﬁdence in the country as a site for clinical
trials (Sunder Rajan 2007). But this has happened almost too quickly “without
the churning, debating and reﬁning of ideas and concepts, application to practice
and critique of that practice, the breaking and formation of public opinion, the
coming together and parting ways of different groups . . . ” (Madhiwalla 2011, 3,
italics added) that is central to the process by which law and law-like guidelines
acquire social meaning (Jasanoff 2011b).
Others emphasize the need for guidelines to be backed up by threat of sanctions.
Commenting on the lack of efﬁcacy of the MCI’s code of conduct, one doctor said,
“it is important to have ethical guidelines. But the profession should enforce them.
We need to develop mechanisms so that a variety of transgressions are regulated
and penalised” (Dr K. Reddy quoted in Jain 2010). Once again, it seems there is
no escaping the hopes pinned on statutory law. However, the question is how vio-
lations of laws or professional codes become visible in the ﬁrst place. Who notices
if something goes wrong? We turn to this question below.
At present, medical ethics violations are dealt with indirectly under various sec-
tions of the Indian Penal Code which deﬁnes criminal acts and related punishments
(Dhar 2010). Section 304-A of the Code deals with complaints against medical
practitioners for alleged medical negligence (Nayak 2004) which includes viola-
tions of medical ethics (Dhar 2010). The civil law of torts is considered to be
among the most signiﬁcant for governing medical malpractice as it has been suc-
cessfully applied in many cases (Peters and Muraleedharan 2008). It applies to
all health professionals, whether in the public or the private sector. This law also
covers circumstances when a clinician treats a patient without informed consent
(Nandimath 2009). The Indian Contract Act of 1872 provides legal protection to
agreements between the parties, but has hardly been used for health issues in
India (Peters and Muraleedharan 2008).
Taken together, these legal avenues appear to offer some statutory weight for
governing medical practices including, unproven stem cell treatments. So, if
such treatments were offered despite recent legal amendments, these cases could,
in theory, be pursued by underpinning legislation such as the Indian Penal Code.
However, the social meaning (Jasanoff 2011b) of any of these laws as they have
been applied in the medical sector is problematic, given the way in which they
have been tended to be interpreted in the courts and entrenched delays in complet-
ing court cases. According to one Indian Supreme Court order, the opinion of an
expert or panel of doctors is necessary to begin a case (Kamath 2010). It is also
alleged that courts have tended to favor medical providers in their rulings (Peters
and Muraleedharan 2008). For example, in one hearing, the Supreme Court
stated that
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. . . it is the bounden duty of civil society to ensure that the medical professionals are
not unnecessarily harassed by complainants who use the criminal process as a tool for
pressurising the medical professionals and hospitals for extracting uncalled for com-
pensation. It would not be conducive to the efﬁciency of the medical profession, if a
doctor is to administer medicine with a halter around his neck. (quoted in Menon
2010, 96)
Until 2010, more than 30 million cases were pending in various courts of India and
one source estimates that it will take 320 years to clear all cases (The Times of India,
6 March 2010). Second, some people who might be able to secure a way of ﬁnan-
cing stem cell treatments in a context of desperation, may not be able to extend
these resources to ﬁght for several years for justice should they have grievances.
A recent high-proﬁle case of alleged medical negligence which resulted in a
hefty payout to the plaintiff in question is perhaps the exception that proves the
rule. In October 2013, the Supreme Court awarded Kunal Saha, a US resident
the highest ever compensation (nearly $1 million) in a medical negligence case
in India following allegations against a hospital in Kolkata which treated his
(now deceased) wife (BBC, 24 October 2013). However, Saha originally launched
his case in 1998 and was able to sustain it through various legal twists and turns.
Clearly, this would be out of the question for most people.
In light of such challenges, Peters and Muraleedharan (2008) suggest that focus-
ing on enforcement of legal mechanisms is insufﬁcient since “the limited ability to
enforce civil and criminal laws in India is well known” (Peters and Muraleedharan
2008, 2137). For instance, the implementation of the 1994 Preconception and Pre-
natal Diagnostic Techniques (PCPNDT) Act was made possible only after the inter-
vention of the Supreme Court in 2000 (Kurup 2011). Similar points about the
limitations of enforcement have been made in relation to other domains such as
the Biological Diversity Act of 2002 (Bhutani and Kohli 2012). Peters and Mura-
leedharan (2008) therefore call for approaches focusing on the capacity of consu-
mers to raise complaints through alternative forums. This then opens up the
possibility of making sense of stem cell governance through a wider perspective
offered by investigations of the relationship between law, medicine and civil
society, a question to which we now turn.
Stem cell governance through civil society
If neither statutory laws nor professional self-regulation is sufﬁcient for govern-
ance, we need to ask how law may be supported or given meaning through its
embedding in civil society. Peters and Muraleedharan’s (2008) approach to this
involves looking for civil society-centered mechanisms for improving the efﬁcacy
of law-in-practice. However, STS and socio-legal approaches (Cloatre and Pickers-
gill 2015; Kim 2013) provoke a more radical re-opening of the very question
around which the notion of a “governance vacuum” in the Indian stem cell
sector has emerged. We consider each of these in turn.
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One way to deal with the limits of the court system is to develop alternative
mechanisms of enforcing medical laws. Here, the Consumer Protection Act
(CPA) 1986 is potentially relevant as it is meant to protect the interests of consu-
mers from poor-quality products/services and provide quicker responses to grie-
vances by circumventing the delays of court cases (Peters and Muraleedharan
2008). Cases are brought to Consumer Forums which do not require court fees.
Medical services were included in this Act in the year 1995 after a Supreme
Court ruling that “patients aggrieved by deﬁciencies in medical services rendered
for payment can claim damages under the act” (Mudur 1995, 1385). However,
complainants still do have costs and delays beyond the stipulated three-month
limit remain a problem. Unsurprisingly, most health cases tend to be brought by
wealthier and educated families (Peters and Muraleedharan 2008).
Also, the CPA covers only private clinicians who offer paid services. As with the
Indian Penal Code, the CPA requires expert advice from other doctors for a case of
alleged malpractice or negligence to be brought (Joshi 2011). This Act also does
not cover clinicians working in public hospitals. In theory, this gap should not
be relevant to the case of stem cell treatments which are primarily offered in
private practice for a fee while services in government-run public hospitals are,
for the most part, free. However, the link between private and public health care
is more blurred in practice with public-sector doctors doing private practice and
sometimes referring their patients to private facilities for certain services. This
may also account for the fact that the private sector accounts for 80% of health
care services in India (Peters and Muraleedharan 2008), despite high levels of
poverty.
If public-sector medicine does become relevant to the governance of stem cell
therapy through interfaces with the private, the gap in the CPA could, in principle,
be addressed through right-to-know laws (Jasanoff 1988) which allow individuals
to access information held by public authorities. India introduced a Right to Infor-
mation Act in 2005 which has been used over the years by activists to seek infor-
mation on clinical trials and publicize ethical violations (Paliwal 2011). Mere
exposure of violations does not guarantee that perpetrators will be held to
account. For example, in one case in Madhya Pradesh, government doctors were
found to have made millions of dollars through their role in corrupt clinical trials
though this resulted in a mere $100 ﬁne (Yee 2012). Still, it is worth asking if
such outcomes might be transformed in future through civil society activism.
Civil society movements have been active in India around a number of science-
related domains including the Chipko movement related to environmental protec-
tion, action around the Bhopal disaster (Jasanoff 1988) and development priorities,
the anti-GM agriculture movement (Scoones 2008) and, more recently, the anti-
nuclear power movement (Srikant 2009). Some of these have impacted state
decisions; for instance, protests against Bt Brinjal, a genetically modiﬁed crop,
forced the Indian government to postpone the approval of commercial release of
this technology. Indeed, at the time of writing, the Indian government has been
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sufﬁciently worried about the impact of environmental and development NGO
challenges to the agenda of unfettered economic growth to brand many of these
activists as “anti-Indian” (Ranjan 2014).
The role of organized civil society action around biomedicine is similarly
becoming stronger; however, the capacity to impact “high-tech” biomedicine is
more complex. Bhattacharya, Proctor, and Hodges (2008) claim that the exploita-
tion of poor people during clinical trials and surrogacy or issues related to the trade
in organs and human tissues have gone unnoticed, failing to create a mass move-
ment. Controversial HPV vaccine trials did, however, spark organized action and
led to the trials being suspended (Sarojini et al. 2010). Following protests in Feb-
ruary 2011 around clinical trials involving victims of the Bhopal gas disaster (Raja-
lakshmi 2012), the government of India was compelled to take action against
clinicians who were involved, though health activists subsequently criticized the
penalty imposed as a mere token (Yee 2012). Such episodes helped to trigger the
government effort in 2013 to amend and strengthen the 1940 Drugs and Cosmetics
Act with new powers to punish violations (Times of India 2013). So, while health
activism does have a history in India (Madhiwalla 2011), it is only now increasing
in national visibility. Medical deference remains widespread, however.
Ultimately, the issue that must be confronted to understand the prospects for gov-
erning stem cell treatments is the fact that these are offered primarily in a private
market, often at high costs. Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner (2009) report that
Indian patients – including many who travel from other parts of the country to
urban centers where stem cell treatments are offered – are mostly from the
upper-middle and upper economic strata. “Medical tourists” include patients
from other developing countries or from the industrialized countries where
approved treatments using stem cells are not yet available, but who are likewise
able to ﬁnd ways of paying for them in India. Much of health activism in India
occurs, for good reason, around the needs of the most marginalized and oppressed
populations, and so, it is unlikely that absence of oversight in expensive commer-
cial health care services would, in itself, be an issue. For example, the Mumbai-
based group Sama states on its website that it “considers health a fundamental
human right and believes that the provision of quality and affordable health care
to every citizen is the responsibility of the state.”2 The group focuses on
women’s health issues in the wider context of socioeconomic realities, and cam-
paigns against the commercialization of health care. From this perspective, it is
those questions that follow from the creation of commercial markets for stem
cell treatments that are the most pertinent.
First, do such markets adversely affect health services for the poor by diverting
investment that might otherwise be spent on basic health care or more recognized
treatments (Patra and Sleeboom-Faulkner 2009)? Second, there are concerns that
such treatments increase health care costs more widely, affecting middle-class
patients who are less afﬂuent. This also affects the viability of medical negligence
law such as the Saha case to serve as a mode of governance, given that increasing
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litigation can drive up insurance costs. Third, should such treatments become incor-
porated into properly demarcated clinical trials, who might ﬁgure as research sub-
jects in this newly regulated domain and what are their chances of receiving
beneﬁts? Sunder Rajan (2007) argues that the real violence in Indian subjects
serving as “guinea pigs” in clinical trials is a structural one – there is no guarantee
that therapies, once developed and approved, would be made generally accessible
at an affordable cost. So, the question with which we began this paper and which
largely frames the debate on Indian stem cell governance needs to be put in its
proper context.
In sum, the ability to enact stem cell laws through civil society mechanisms
remains limited, unless patients perceive their rights to have been violated and
have the wherewithal to follow through. So far, there is little evidence of this.
More signiﬁcantly, looking at stem cell governance through a civil society lens
allows us open up broader questions as Kim (2013) has done with reference to
South Korea. A key question for future work might be to explore opportunities
for activists to reframe the concern about a “governance vacuum” around unproven
therapies to a social justice concern about the very development of stem cell bio-
medicine in a context of radical social and health care inequalities.
Conclusion
We began this paper by asking why it has been difﬁcult to govern stem cell treat-
ments offered in India, and the prospects for this vacuum in governance (Salter
2008; Sleeboom-Faulkner and Patra 2008) to be remedied. Many social scientists
as well as Indian stem cell scientists have argued that the answer is to create stat-
utory/legal backing for stem cell research guidelines developed by the two major
agencies in the sector, the ICMR and the DBT. Drawing from STS and socio-
legal approaches, we argued that this diagnosis of a statutory gap was inadequate
since the construction of law and the boundaries of regulatory objects need atten-
tion as do the ways in which laws and law-like behavior work in practice through
social and institutional interactions (Jasanoff 2005, 2011b). Indeed, the statutory
gap in Indian stem cell governance was recently addressed with changes announced
in 2014 to the DCGI’s legal remit and a revised set of guidelines produced by the
ICMR-DBT guidelines at the same time. But questions still remain over the
capacity to enact law-in-practice and enforce the new laws.
Our work highlighted a key jurisdictional ambiguity around stem cell therapy.
The ICMR-DBT guidelines were framed in terms of stem cell research, but
research implies the conduct of clinical trials. Until recently, stem cell therapies
escaped the regulatory net of the DCGI as they did not take place under the aus-
pices of a trial, sitting primarily in a private market for clinical services. Patients
may have taken the risk – or opportunity – of “therapeutic consumption”
(Sunder Rajan 2007) without a system of governmental protection backed up
by the ability to enforce sanctions. But this indicates that the reputational
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controversy around Indian stem cell activities did not affect clinical practice even
though it damaged the cause of research and eventually led to the recent amend-
ments. The ability to enact these laws in practice depends on their interactions
with the medical profession (speciﬁcally, mechanisms such as codes of conduct
issued by the MCI), the wider ediﬁce of health care governance (speciﬁcally, stat-
utory and quasi-statutory options available through the Indian Penal Code or the
1986 CPA) and civil society activism. However, we found that these too are pro-
blematic for a number of reasons. The rise in formal frameworks of medical
ethics and research ethics has not yet been accompanied by the deliberation
and learning from practice that is normally required to give them meaning (Mad-
hiwalla 2011). If legal violations go unnoticed, a de facto “governance vacuum”
would still persist. Medical negligence cases may be on the rise in India, but
hardly represent a viable option for the majority, not least for the costs they
impose on individuals and on the health care system as a whole. Civil society
activism around health is becoming more visible, but this is necessarily centered
on remedying the serious inequalities of health care access in a country where the
commercial sector accounts for 80% of health care services rather than violations
in stem cell treatments per se.
In the end, we need to acknowledge that stem cell treatments are primarily
offered to those who can afford them – or, who ﬁnd the means to afford them.
This then means asking not only whose rights are potentially being violated by
unethical/unregulated treatments, but what the rise of such commercial treatments
means for others’ rights to health care. It also means attending to the question of
who can currently afford to participate in such a market, and who is effectively
excluded at the outset from future markets for better regulated/certiﬁed forms of
stem cell treatment. The vacuum around stem cell activity in India – be it a
vacuum in governance or in bioethical behavior – is more problematic than a
simple failure to adequately enforce guidelines through statutory or non-statutory
means. Rather, the vacuum encompasses multiple inequalities in the politics of
life (Raman and Tutton 2010) that shape the governance and delivery of health
care which need to be placed center stage in such debates over biomedical research
governance.
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